sigtool/sign/encrypt.go
Sudhi Herle 21445ba1a1 First working version of encrypt/decrypt
* use protobuf for encryption-header
* use fixed size file-header (42 bytes) before the encryption-header
* add encryption/decryption contexts
* teach MakePrivateKey() to fixup its internal public key bits
2019-10-17 14:29:01 -07:00

634 lines
14 KiB
Go

// cipher.go -- Ed25519 based encrypt/decrypt
//
// (c) 2016 Sudhi Herle <sudhi@herle.net>
//
// Licensing Terms: GPLv2
//
// If you need a commercial license for this work, please contact
// the author.
//
// This software does not come with any express or implied
// warranty; it is provided "as is". No claim is made to its
// suitability for any purpose.
package sign
import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/sha512"
"crypto/subtle"
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
"io"
"math/big"
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
)
// Encryption chunk size = 4MB
const chunkSize int = 4 * 1048576
const _Magic = "SigTool"
const _MagicLen = len(_Magic)
const _AEADNonceLen = 32
// Encryptor holds the encryption context
type Encryptor struct {
Header
key [32]byte // file encryption key
ae cipher.AEAD
sender *PrivateKey
started bool
buf []byte
}
// Create a new Encryption context and use the optional private key 'sk' for
// signing any recipient keys. If 'sk' is nil, then ephmeral Curve25519 keys
// are generated and used with recipient's public key.
func NewEncryptor(sk *PrivateKey) (*Encryptor, error) {
e := &Encryptor{
Header: Header{
ChunkSize: uint32(chunkSize),
Salt: make([]byte, _AEADNonceLen),
},
sender: sk,
}
randread(e.key[:])
randread(e.Salt)
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(e.key[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypt: %s", err)
}
e.ae, err = cipher.NewGCMWithNonceSize(aes, _AEADNonceLen)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypt: %s", err)
}
e.buf = make([]byte, chunkSize + 4 + e.ae.Overhead())
return e, nil
}
// Add a new recipient to this encryption context.
func (e *Encryptor) AddRecipient(pk *PublicKey) error {
if e.started {
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: can't add new recipient after encryption has started")
}
var w *WrappedKey
var err error
if e.sender != nil {
w, err = e.sender.WrapKey(pk, e.key[:])
} else {
w, err = pk.WrapKeyEphemeral(e.key[:])
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
e.Keys = append(e.Keys, w)
return nil
}
// Begin the encryption process by writing the header
func (e *Encryptor) start(wr io.Writer) error {
msize := e.Size()
// marshal the header and recipients
hdrlen := _MagicLen + 1 + 4 + sha256.Size
buf := make([]byte, hdrlen + msize)
hdrbuf := buf[hdrlen:]
copy(buf[:], []byte(_Magic))
buf[_MagicLen] = 1 // file version#
// The fixed header is the magic _and _ the length of the variable segment.
// So, we capture the length of the variable portion first.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[_MagicLen + 1:], uint32(sha256.Size + msize))
// Now marshal the variable portion
_, err := e.MarshalToSizedBuffer(hdrbuf)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: can't marshal header: %s", err)
}
// and calculate the header checksum
cksum := buf[_MagicLen + 1 + 4:]
h := sha256.New()
h.Write(hdrbuf)
h.Sum(cksum[:0])
// Finally write it out
err = fullwrite(buf, wr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: %s", err)
}
e.started = true
return nil
}
// Write _all_ bytes of buffer 'buf'
func fullwrite(buf []byte, wr io.Writer) error {
n := len(buf)
for n > 0 {
m, err := wr.Write(buf)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("I/O error: %s", err)
}
n -= m
buf = buf[m:]
}
return nil
}
// Encrypt the input stream 'rd' and write encrypted stream to 'wr'
func (e *Encryptor) Encrypt(rd io.Reader, wr io.Writer) error {
if !e.started {
err := e.start(wr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
buf := make([]byte, e.ChunkSize)
i := 0
for {
n, err := io.ReadAtLeast(rd, buf, int(e.ChunkSize))
if n == 0 {
return nil
}
if n > 0 {
err = e.encrypt(buf[:n], wr, i)
if err != nil {
return err
}
i++
continue
}
if err != nil && err != io.EOF {
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: I/O read error: %s", err)
}
}
}
// encrypt exactly _one_ block of data
// The nonce for the block is: sha256(salt || chunkLen || block#)
// This protects the output stream from re-ordering attacks and length
// modification attacks. The encoded length & block number is used as
// additional data in the AEAD construction.
func (e *Encryptor) encrypt(buf []byte, wr io.Writer, i int) error {
var b [8]byte
var noncebuf [32]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[:4], uint32(e.ae.Overhead() + len(buf)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[4:], uint32(i))
h := sha256.New()
h.Write(e.Salt)
h.Write(b[:])
nonce := h.Sum(noncebuf[:0])
copy(e.buf[:4], b[:4])
cbuf := e.buf[4:]
c := e.ae.Seal(cbuf[:0], nonce, buf, b[:])
n := len(c) + 4
err := fullwrite(e.buf[:n], wr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: %s", err)
}
return nil
}
// Decryptor holds the decryption context
type Decryptor struct {
Header
ae cipher.AEAD
rd io.Reader
buf []byte
// Decrypted key
key []byte
}
// Create a new decryption context and if 'pk' is given, check that it matches
// the sender
func NewDecryptor(rd io.Reader, pk *PublicKey) (*Decryptor, error) {
var b [12]byte
_, err := io.ReadFull(rd, b[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if bytes.Compare(b[:_MagicLen], []byte(_Magic)) != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: Not a sigtool encrypted file?")
}
if b[_MagicLen] != 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: Unsupported version %d", b[_MagicLen])
}
hdrlen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[_MagicLen+1:])
if hdrlen > 65536 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: header too large (max 65536)")
}
if hdrlen < 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: header too small (min 32)")
}
hdr := make([]byte, hdrlen)
_, err = io.ReadFull(rd, hdr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
verify := hdr[:32]
hdr = hdr[32:]
cksum := sha256.Sum256(hdr)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, cksum[:]) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: header corrupted")
}
d := &Decryptor{
rd: rd,
}
err = d.Header.Unmarshal(hdr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: decode error: %s", err)
}
if d.ChunkSize == 0 || d.ChunkSize > (16 * 1048576) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: invalid chunkSize %d", d.ChunkSize)
}
if len(d.Salt) != 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: invalid nonce length %d", len(d.Salt))
}
if len(d.Keys) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: no wrapped keys")
}
// sanity check on the wrapped keys
for i, w := range d.Keys {
if len(w.PkHash) != PKHashLength {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped key %d: invalid PkHash", i)
}
if len(w.Pk) != 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped key %d: invalid Curve25519 PK", i)
}
// XXX Default AES-256-GCM Nonce size is 12
if len(w.Nonce) != 12 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped key %d: invalid Nonce", i)
}
if len(w.Key) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped key %d: missing encrypted key", i)
}
}
d.buf = make([]byte, d.ChunkSize)
if pk != nil {
validSender := false
pkh := pk.Hash()
for _, w := range d.Keys {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(pkh, w.PkHash) == 1 {
validSender = true
}
}
if !validSender {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: Can't find sender's public key in the header")
}
}
return d, nil
}
// Use Private Key 'sk' to decrypt the encrypted keys in the header
func (d *Decryptor) SetPrivateKey(sk *PrivateKey) error {
var err error
pkh := sk.PublicKey().Hash()
for i, w := range d.Keys {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(pkh, w.PkHash) == 1 {
d.key, err = w.UnwrapKey(sk)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: can't unwrap key %d: %s", i, err)
}
goto havekey
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: Can't find any public key to match the given private key")
havekey:
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(d.key)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: %s", err)
}
d.ae, err = cipher.NewGCMWithNonceSize(aes, _AEADNonceLen)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: %s", err)
}
return nil
}
// Return a list of Wrapped keys in the encrypted file header
func (d *Decryptor) WrappedKeys() []*WrappedKey {
return d.Keys
}
// Decrypt the file and write to 'wr'
func (d *Decryptor) Decrypt(wr io.Writer) error {
if d.key == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped-key not decrypted (missing SetPrivateKey()?")
}
for i := 0; ; i++ {
c, err := d.decrypt(i)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(c) == 0 {
return nil
}
if len(c) > 0 {
err = fullwrite(c, wr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: %s", err)
}
}
}
return nil
}
// Decrypt exactly one chunk of data
func (d *Decryptor) decrypt(i int) ([]byte, error) {
var b [8]byte
var nonceb [32]byte
n, err := io.ReadFull(d.rd, b[:4])
if n == 0 || err == io.EOF {
return nil, nil
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: can't read chunk %d length: %s", i, err)
}
chunklen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[4:], uint32(i))
h := sha256.New()
h.Write(d.Salt)
h.Write(b[:])
nonce := h.Sum(nonceb[:0])
n, err = io.ReadFull(d.rd, d.buf[:chunklen])
if n == 0 || err == io.EOF {
return nil, nil
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: can't read chunk %d: %s", i, err)
}
p, err := d.ae.Open(d.buf[:0], nonce, d.buf[:chunklen], b[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: can't decrypt chunk %d: %s", i, err)
}
return p, nil
}
// given a file-encryption-key, wrap it in the identity of the recipient 'pk' using our
// secret key. This function identifies the sender.
func (sk *PrivateKey) WrapKey(pk *PublicKey, key []byte) (*WrappedKey, error) {
var shared, theirPK, ourSK [32]byte
copy(ourSK[:], sk.toCurve25519SK())
copy(theirPK[:], pk.toCurve25519PK())
curve25519.ScalarMult(&shared, &ourSK, &theirPK)
return wrapKey(pk, key, theirPK[:], shared[:])
}
// Unwrap a wrapped key using the private key 'sk'
func (w *WrappedKey) UnwrapKey(sk *PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
var shared, theirPK, ourSK [32]byte
pk := sk.PublicKey()
copy(ourSK[:], sk.toCurve25519SK())
copy(theirPK[:], w.Pk)
curve25519.ScalarMult(&shared, &ourSK, &theirPK)
key, err := aeadOpen(w.Key, w.Nonce, shared[:], pk.Pk)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return key, nil
}
// Wrap a shared key with the recipient's public key 'pk' by generating an ephemeral
// Curve25519 keypair. This function does not identify the sender (non-repudiation).
func (pk *PublicKey) WrapKeyEphemeral(key []byte) (*WrappedKey, error) {
var shared, newSK, newPK, theirPK [32]byte
randread(newSK[:])
copy(theirPK[:], pk.toCurve25519PK())
curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&newPK, &newSK)
curve25519.ScalarMult(&shared, &newSK, &theirPK)
// we throw away newSK after deriving the shared key.
// The recipient can derive the same key using theirSK and newPK.
// (newPK will be marshalled and returned by this function)
return wrapKey(pk, key, newPK[:], shared[:])
}
func wrapKey(pk *PublicKey, k, theirPK, shared []byte) (*WrappedKey, error) {
ek, nonce, err := aeadSeal(k, shared[:], pk.Pk)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err)
}
return &WrappedKey{
PkHash: pk.hash,
Pk: theirPK,
Nonce: nonce,
Key: ek,
}, nil
}
// Convert an Ed25519 Private Key to Curve25519 Private key
func (sk *PrivateKey) toCurve25519SK() []byte {
if sk.ck == nil {
var ek [64]byte
h := sha512.New()
h.Write(sk.Sk[:32])
h.Sum(ek[:0])
sk.ck = clamp(ek[:32])
}
return sk.ck
}
// from github.com/FiloSottile/age
var curve25519P, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("57896044618658097711785492504343953926634992332820282019728792003956564819949", 10)
// Convert an Ed25519 Public Key to Curve25519 public key
// from github.com/FiloSottile/age
func (pk *PublicKey) toCurve25519PK() []byte {
if pk.ck != nil {
return pk.ck
}
// ed25519.PublicKey is a little endian representation of the y-coordinate,
// with the most significant bit set based on the sign of the x-ccordinate.
bigEndianY := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize)
for i, b := range pk.Pk {
bigEndianY[ed25519.PublicKeySize-i-1] = b
}
bigEndianY[0] &= 0b0111_1111
// The Montgomery u-coordinate is derived through the bilinear map
//
// u = (1 + y) / (1 - y)
//
// See https://blog.filippo.io/using-ed25519-keys-for-encryption.
y := new(big.Int).SetBytes(bigEndianY)
denom := big.NewInt(1)
denom.ModInverse(denom.Sub(denom, y), curve25519P) // 1 / (1 - y)
u := y.Mul(y.Add(y, big.NewInt(1)), denom)
u.Mod(u, curve25519P)
out := make([]byte, 32)
uBytes := u.Bytes()
n := len(uBytes)
for i, b := range uBytes {
out[n-i-1] = b
}
pk.ck = out
return out
}
// generate a KEK from a shared DH key and a Pub Key
func expand(shared, pk []byte) ([]byte, error) {
kek := make([]byte, 32)
h := hkdf.New(sha512.New, shared, pk, nil)
_, err := io.ReadFull(h, kek)
return kek, err
}
// seal the data via AEAD after suitably expanding 'shared'
func aeadSeal(data, shared, pk []byte) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
kek, err := expand(shared[:], pk)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err)
}
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(kek)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err)
}
ae, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err)
}
noncesize := ae.NonceSize()
tagsize := ae.Overhead()
buf := make([]byte, tagsize + len(kek))
nonce := make([]byte, noncesize)
randread(nonce)
out := ae.Seal(buf[:0], nonce, data, nil)
return out, nonce, nil
}
func aeadOpen(data, nonce, shared, pk []byte) ([]byte, error) {
// hkdf or HMAC-sha-256
kek, err := expand(shared, pk)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err)
}
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(kek)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err)
}
ae, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err)
}
want := 32 + ae.Overhead()
if len(data) != want {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: incorrect decrypt bytes (need %d, saw %d)", want, len(data))
}
c, err := ae.Open(data[:0], nonce, data, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err)
}
return c, nil
}
func clamp(k []byte) []byte {
k[0] &= 248
k[31] &= 127
k[31] |= 64
return k
}