// encrypt.go -- Ed25519 based encrypt/decrypt // // (c) 2016 Sudhi Herle // // Licensing Terms: GPLv2 // // If you need a commercial license for this work, please contact // the author. // // This software does not come with any express or implied // warranty; it is provided "as is". No claim is made to its // suitability for any purpose. // // Implementation Notes for Encryption/Decryption: // // Header: has 3 parts: // - Fixed sized header // - Variable sized protobuf encoded header // - SHA256 sum of both above. // // Fixed size header: // - Magic: 7 bytes // - Version: 1 byte // - VLen: 4 byte // // Variable Length Segment: // - Protobuf encoded, per-recipient wrapped keys // - Shasum: 32 bytes (SHA256 of full header) // // The variable length segment consists of one or more // recipients, their wrapped keys etc. This is encoded as // a protobuf message. This protobuf encoded message immediately // follows the fixed length header. // // The input data is broken up into "chunks"; each no larger than // maxChunkSize. The default block size is "chunkSize". Each block // is AEAD encrypted: // AEAD nonce = SHA256(header.salt || block# || block-size) // // The encrypted block (includes the AEAD tag) length is written // as a big-endian 4-byte prefix. The high-order bit of this length // field is set for the last-block (denoting EOF). // // The encrypted blocks use an opinionated nonce length of 32 (_AEADNonceLen). package sign import ( "bytes" "crypto/aes" "crypto/cipher" "crypto/ed25519" "crypto/sha256" "crypto/sha512" "crypto/subtle" "encoding/binary" "fmt" "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" "golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf" "io" "math/big" ) // Encryption chunk size = 4MB const ( chunkSize uint32 = 4 * 1048576 maxChunkSize uint32 = 16 * 1048576 _EOF uint32 = 1 << 31 _Magic = "SigTool" _MagicLen = len(_Magic) _AEADNonceLen = 32 _FixedHdrLen = _MagicLen + 1 + 4 ) // Encryptor holds the encryption context type Encryptor struct { Header key [32]byte // file encryption key ae cipher.AEAD sender *PrivateKey started bool buf []byte } // Create a new Encryption context and use the optional private key 'sk' for // signing any recipient keys. If 'sk' is nil, then ephmeral Curve25519 keys // are generated and used with recipient's public key. func NewEncryptor(sk *PrivateKey, blksize uint64) (*Encryptor, error) { var blksz uint32 switch { case blksize == 0: blksz = chunkSize case blksize > uint64(maxChunkSize): blksz = maxChunkSize default: blksz = uint32(blksize) } e := &Encryptor{ Header: Header{ ChunkSize: blksz, Salt: make([]byte, _AEADNonceLen), }, sender: sk, } randread(e.key[:]) randread(e.Salt) aes, err := aes.NewCipher(e.key[:]) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypt: %s", err) } e.ae, err = cipher.NewGCMWithNonceSize(aes, _AEADNonceLen) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypt: %s", err) } e.buf = make([]byte, blksz+4+uint32(e.ae.Overhead())) return e, nil } // Add a new recipient to this encryption context. func (e *Encryptor) AddRecipient(pk *PublicKey) error { if e.started { return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: can't add new recipient after encryption has started") } var w *WrappedKey var err error if e.sender != nil { w, err = e.sender.WrapKey(pk, e.key[:]) } else { w, err = pk.WrapKeyEphemeral(e.key[:]) } if err != nil { return err } e.Keys = append(e.Keys, w) return nil } // Encrypt the input stream 'rd' and write encrypted stream to 'wr' func (e *Encryptor) Encrypt(rd io.Reader, wr io.Writer) error { if !e.started { err := e.start(wr) if err != nil { return err } } buf := make([]byte, e.ChunkSize) var i uint32 var eof bool for !eof { n, err := io.ReadAtLeast(rd, buf, int(e.ChunkSize)) if err != nil { switch err { case io.EOF, io.ErrClosedPipe, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF: eof = true default: return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: I/O read error: %s", err) } } if n >= 0 { err = e.encrypt(buf[:n], wr, i, eof) if err != nil { return err } i++ } } return nil } // Begin the encryption process by writing the header func (e *Encryptor) start(wr io.Writer) error { varSize := e.Size() buffer := make([]byte, _FixedHdrLen+varSize+sha256.Size) fixHdr := buffer[:_FixedHdrLen] varHdr := buffer[_FixedHdrLen:] sumHdr := varHdr[varSize:] // Now assemble the fixed header copy(fixHdr[:], []byte(_Magic)) fixHdr[_MagicLen] = 1 // version # binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(fixHdr[_MagicLen+1:], uint32(varSize)) // Now marshal the variable portion _, err := e.MarshalToSizedBuffer(varHdr[:varSize]) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: can't marshal header: %s", err) } // Now calculate checksum of everything h := sha256.New() h.Write(buffer[:_FixedHdrLen+varSize]) h.Sum(sumHdr[:0]) // Finally write it out err = fullwrite(buffer, wr) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: %s", err) } e.started = true return nil } // Write _all_ bytes of buffer 'buf' func fullwrite(buf []byte, wr io.Writer) error { n := len(buf) for n > 0 { m, err := wr.Write(buf) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("I/O error: %s", err) } n -= m buf = buf[m:] } return nil } // encrypt exactly _one_ block of data // The nonce for the block is: sha256(salt || chunkLen || block#) // This protects the output stream from re-ordering attacks and length // modification attacks. The encoded length & block number is used as // additional data in the AEAD construction. func (e *Encryptor) encrypt(buf []byte, wr io.Writer, i uint32, eof bool) error { var b [8]byte var noncebuf [32]byte var z uint32 = uint32(len(buf)) // mark last block if eof { z |= _EOF } binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[:4], z) binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[4:], i) h := sha256.New() h.Write(e.Salt) h.Write(b[:]) nonce := h.Sum(noncebuf[:0]) copy(e.buf[:4], b[:4]) cbuf := e.buf[4:] c := e.ae.Seal(cbuf[:0], nonce, buf, b[:]) // total number of bytes written n := len(c) + 4 err := fullwrite(e.buf[:n], wr) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: %s", err) } return nil } // Decryptor holds the decryption context type Decryptor struct { Header ae cipher.AEAD rd io.Reader buf []byte // Decrypted key key []byte eof bool } // Create a new decryption context and if 'pk' is given, check that it matches // the sender func NewDecryptor(rd io.Reader) (*Decryptor, error) { var b [_FixedHdrLen]byte _, err := io.ReadFull(rd, b[:]) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: err while reading header: %s", err) } if bytes.Compare(b[:_MagicLen], []byte(_Magic)) != 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: Not a sigtool encrypted file?") } if b[_MagicLen] != 1 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: Unsupported version %d", b[_MagicLen]) } varSize := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[_MagicLen+1:]) // sanity check on variable segment length if varSize > 1048576 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: header too large (max 1048576)") } if varSize < 32 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: header too small (min 32)") } // SHA256 is the trailer part of the file-header varBuf := make([]byte, varSize+sha256.Size) _, err = io.ReadFull(rd, varBuf) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: err while reading header: %s", err) } verify := varBuf[varSize:] h := sha256.New() h.Write(b[:]) h.Write(varBuf[:varSize]) cksum := h.Sum(nil) if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, cksum[:]) == 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: header corrupted") } d := &Decryptor{ rd: rd, } err = d.Header.Unmarshal(varBuf[:varSize]) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: decode error: %s", err) } if d.ChunkSize == 0 || d.ChunkSize >= maxChunkSize { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: invalid chunkSize %d", d.ChunkSize) } if len(d.Salt) != _AEADNonceLen { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: invalid nonce length %d", len(d.Salt)) } if len(d.Keys) == 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: no wrapped keys") } // sanity check on the wrapped keys for i, w := range d.Keys { if len(w.PkHash) != PKHashLength { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped key %d: invalid PkHash", i) } if len(w.Pk) != 32 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped key %d: invalid Curve25519 PK", i) } // XXX Default AES-256-GCM Nonce size is 12 if len(w.Nonce) != 12 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped key %d: invalid Nonce", i) } if len(w.Key) == 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped key %d: missing encrypted key", i) } } return d, nil } // Use Private Key 'sk' to decrypt the encrypted keys in the header and optionally validate // the sender func (d *Decryptor) SetPrivateKey(sk *PrivateKey, senderPk *PublicKey) error { var err error pkh := sk.PublicKey().Hash() for i, w := range d.Keys { if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(pkh, w.PkHash) == 1 { d.key, err = w.UnwrapKey(sk, senderPk) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: can't unwrap key %d: %s", i, err) } goto havekey } } return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: Can't find any public key to match the given private key") havekey: aes, err := aes.NewCipher(d.key) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: %s", err) } d.ae, err = cipher.NewGCMWithNonceSize(aes, _AEADNonceLen) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: %s", err) } d.buf = make([]byte, int(d.ChunkSize)+d.ae.Overhead()) return nil } // Return a list of Wrapped keys in the encrypted file header func (d *Decryptor) WrappedKeys() []*WrappedKey { return d.Keys } // Decrypt the file and write to 'wr' func (d *Decryptor) Decrypt(wr io.Writer) error { if d.key == nil { return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: wrapped-key not decrypted (missing SetPrivateKey()?") } if d.eof { return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: input stream has reached EOF") } var i uint32 for i = 0; ; i++ { c, eof, err := d.decrypt(i) if err != nil { return err } if len(c) > 0 { err = fullwrite(c, wr) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: %s", err) } } if eof { d.eof = true return nil } } return nil } // Decrypt exactly one chunk of data func (d *Decryptor) decrypt(i uint32) ([]byte, bool, error) { var b [8]byte var nonceb [32]byte var ovh uint32 = uint32(d.ae.Overhead()) var p []byte n, err := io.ReadFull(d.rd, b[:4]) if err != nil || n == 0 { return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: premature EOF while reading header block %d", i) } m := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]) eof := (m & _EOF) > 0 m &= (_EOF - 1) // Sanity check - in case of corrupt header switch { case m > uint32(d.ChunkSize): return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: chunksize is too large (%d)", m) case m == 0: if !eof { return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: block %d: zero-sized chunk without EOF", i) } return p, eof, nil case m < ovh: return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: chunksize is too small (%d)", m) default: } binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[4:], i) h := sha256.New() h.Write(d.Salt) h.Write(b[:]) nonce := h.Sum(nonceb[:0]) z := m + ovh n, err = io.ReadFull(d.rd, d.buf[:z]) if err != nil { return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: premature EOF while reading block %d: %s", i, err) } p, err = d.ae.Open(d.buf[:0], nonce, d.buf[:n], b[:]) if err != nil { return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("decrypt: can't decrypt chunk %d: %s", i, err) } return p[:m], eof, nil } // Wrap a shared key with the recipient's public key 'pk' by generating an ephemeral // Curve25519 keypair. This function does not identify the sender (non-repudiation). func (pk *PublicKey) WrapKeyEphemeral(key []byte) (*WrappedKey, error) { var newSK [32]byte randread(newSK[:]) clamp(newSK[:]) return wrapKey(pk, key, newSK[:]) } // given a file-encryption-key, wrap it in the identity of the recipient 'pk' using our // secret key. This function identifies the sender. func (sk *PrivateKey) WrapKey(pk *PublicKey, key []byte) (*WrappedKey, error) { return wrapKey(pk, key, sk.toCurve25519SK()) } func wrapKey(pk *PublicKey, k []byte, ourSK []byte) (*WrappedKey, error) { curvePK, err := curve25519.X25519(ourSK, curve25519.Basepoint) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err) } shared, err := curve25519.X25519(ourSK, pk.toCurve25519PK()) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err) } ek, nonce, err := aeadSeal(k, shared, pk.Pk) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err) } return &WrappedKey{ PkHash: pk.hash, Pk: curvePK, Nonce: nonce, Key: ek, }, nil } // Unwrap a wrapped key using the private key 'sk' func (w *WrappedKey) UnwrapKey(sk *PrivateKey, senderPk *PublicKey) ([]byte, error) { ourSK := sk.toCurve25519SK() shared, err := curve25519.X25519(ourSK, w.Pk) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err) } if senderPk != nil { shared2, err := curve25519.X25519(ourSK, senderPk.toCurve25519PK()) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err) } if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(shared2, shared) != 1 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: sender validation failed") } } pk := sk.PublicKey() key, err := aeadOpen(w.Key, w.Nonce, shared[:], pk.Pk) if err != nil { return nil, err } return key, nil } // Convert an Ed25519 Private Key to Curve25519 Private key func (sk *PrivateKey) toCurve25519SK() []byte { if sk.ck == nil { var ek [64]byte h := sha512.New() h.Write(sk.Sk[:32]) h.Sum(ek[:0]) sk.ck = clamp(ek[:32]) } return sk.ck } // from github.com/FiloSottile/age var curve25519P, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("57896044618658097711785492504343953926634992332820282019728792003956564819949", 10) // Convert an Ed25519 Public Key to Curve25519 public key // from github.com/FiloSottile/age func (pk *PublicKey) toCurve25519PK() []byte { if pk.ck != nil { return pk.ck } // ed25519.PublicKey is a little endian representation of the y-coordinate, // with the most significant bit set based on the sign of the x-ccordinate. bigEndianY := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize) for i, b := range pk.Pk { bigEndianY[ed25519.PublicKeySize-i-1] = b } bigEndianY[0] &= 0b0111_1111 // The Montgomery u-coordinate is derived through the bilinear map // // u = (1 + y) / (1 - y) // // See https://blog.filippo.io/using-ed25519-keys-for-encryption. y := new(big.Int).SetBytes(bigEndianY) denom := big.NewInt(1) denom.ModInverse(denom.Sub(denom, y), curve25519P) // 1 / (1 - y) u := y.Mul(y.Add(y, big.NewInt(1)), denom) u.Mod(u, curve25519P) out := make([]byte, 32) uBytes := u.Bytes() n := len(uBytes) for i, b := range uBytes { out[n-i-1] = b } pk.ck = out return out } // generate a KEK from a shared DH key and a Pub Key func expand(shared, pk []byte) ([]byte, error) { kek := make([]byte, 32) h := hkdf.New(sha512.New, shared, pk, nil) _, err := io.ReadFull(h, kek) return kek, err } // seal the data via AEAD after suitably expanding 'shared' func aeadSeal(data, shared, pk []byte) ([]byte, []byte, error) { kek, err := expand(shared[:], pk) if err != nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err) } aes, err := aes.NewCipher(kek) if err != nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err) } ae, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes) if err != nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap: %s", err) } noncesize := ae.NonceSize() tagsize := ae.Overhead() buf := make([]byte, tagsize+len(kek)) nonce := make([]byte, noncesize) randread(nonce) out := ae.Seal(buf[:0], nonce, data, nil) return out, nonce, nil } func aeadOpen(data, nonce, shared, pk []byte) ([]byte, error) { // hkdf or HMAC-sha-256 kek, err := expand(shared, pk) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err) } aes, err := aes.NewCipher(kek) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err) } ae, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err) } want := 32 + ae.Overhead() if len(data) != want { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: incorrect decrypt bytes (need %d, saw %d)", want, len(data)) } c, err := ae.Open(data[:0], nonce, data, nil) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap: %s", err) } return c, nil } func clamp(k []byte) []byte { k[0] &= 248 k[31] &= 127 k[31] |= 64 return k }